General discussion : demographic changes and international factor mobility by Martin Feldstein & Chair
Mr. Feldstein: There is an interesting forthcoming NBER working
paper that touches on the first issue that Alan Taylor showed us in his
graphs: the change in international capital flows from an earlier
period to today. The paper looks at what happened when Teddy
Roosevelt decided to expand the Monroe Doctrine to declare that the
United States had the right to intervene militarily in Central America
when countries defaulted on their obligations. It turned out that we
did not do much of that, but the spread on interest rates in those
countries fell immediately by a very substantial amount. That may
help explain why when gunboat diplomacy went out of fashion, the
capital flows also began to shrink.
Mr. Balcerowicz: My question is about the politics of pension
reform, which was raised earlier. I have an impression there was a note
of hopelessness that nothing can be done because pensioners domi-
nate the voting process, etc. However, there are a number of countries
that have reformed their pension systems. So, there is sort of a natural
experiment that should allow us to compare what the politics were
behind those countries that have reformed and those that did not
reform. It would be a fruitful empirical study. I doubt whether those
countries that reached reform have a lower ratio of pensioners to
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are central European countries, including my own: Poland. I can tell
you from experience that this reform did not provoke much resistance,
certainly much less than some privatizations—the deregulation of
labor markets or cutting current expenditures. The question is: Why?
In the Polish case, and I suppose we were not unique, there were
certain conditions that were met. 
First, this pension reform was a bipartisan endeavor. Second, there
was a bipartisan leadership. There was a very good public relations
campaign. And lastly, the future pensioners were addressed—not the
current pensioners but the future pensioners. Thanks to this
campaign, the picture was presented that without reform of the
pension system they would not have any pension. So, they supported
the pension reform.
Mr. Crockett: I would like to congratulate the Kansas City Fed for
inviting John Helliwell to give a talk at this stage. It makes us much
more encouraged than we would otherwise be, because it reminds us
that we are dealing with the consequences of things that in themselves
are very good. Everybody is living longer and healthier lives. And
people have a greater opportunity to choose the size of their families. 
We have allowed those good things to create some economic prob-
lems. But it should not be impossible to find solutions to those
problems that would leave us much better off. As Helliwell pointed
out, given that people are living longer and healthier lives, they can
easily work to an older age. There is no physiological reason why the
dependency ratio should rise, or at least rise by as much as we are now
projecting. Moreover, Helliwell is telling us that if people would only
accustom themselves to the idea of working longer and being more
“engaged,” they would actually be happier and therefore would not
resist later retirement in the way we now observe. So the issue is: How
do we get people to want what we believe they would end up liking?
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to leave us in a more happy frame of mind, if he could speculate a
little bit on what economic measures, or educational measures, or
public relations measures could encourage people to think more
positively about the benefits that would flow from this longer
working life. If people would work longer, and they now can work
longer, not only would we deal substantively with a large part of the
fiscal problem, but maybe we would even deal with the happiness
problem too.
Mr. Dugger: A number of people have raised the question of poli-
tics as a solution. A number of important observations have been
made about it. Let me report on some discussions that are going
forward with board members of AARP, the National Council on
Aging, and other senior groups in Washington. Those discussions,
when they involve thoughtful people on both sides, are certainly from
the senior side resulting in questions about the range of entitlements
that are on the table for discussion. This is clearly an example of how
John Helliwell’s engagement concept or maybe an older idea of just
benefit gains from trade. What seniors are saying back to representa-
tives of senior groups is that if a benefit authorized under law is on
the table and the issue is long-term growth, why are not all benefits
provided for under law on the table? They have specific references to
a number of hard-to-justify corporate entitlements, other kinds of tax
expenditures, etc. The list is fairly long. From my standpoint, it is
very clear that the senior advocacy community in the United States is
completely aware of everything we have been talking about. They are
open to all of the IMF-type adjustments with respect to pensions.
They are open to more imaginative proposals with respect to
Medicare, which is a much more serious problem, such as not offer-
ing benefits to a generation. That is, they would assign their last year
life benefits—they were open to a discussion of this—and allocate it
to young people, if they thought that none of that money was going
to be allocated elsewhere in ways that do not contribute to long-term
economic growth. Politically, these discussions are going forward.
They involve increasingly an insistence that all benefits provided
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should be the objective against which these benefits are considered.
Ms. Swonk: Alan Taylor referred to the issue of taking very low-
skilled workers and getting them a productivity boost when they go
to the host country. For example, if you walk into McDonald’s restau-
rant in much of the Chicago area, there are icons on the cash register
so employees do not need to actually read English to take the
customer’s order. You can just push the icons that have pictures of
hamburgers or whatever you are ordering. The machine also tells you
what to give back in change.
The other issue is one that John Taylor and I brought up yesterday,
which does not seem to be in the conversation. It deals with global
capital flows and the remittance issue. There are two issues there. One
of the benefits is—John cited a $100 billion number bigger than
foreign-direct investment in many of these countries—there is a
benefit to the home country of the immigrants leaving. There is also
a huge benefit, looking at it from a banking industry’s perspective—
Citigroup has started to move in this direction—if you can capture
those remittances within the financial system, you can also bring
people into the financial system more effectively and perhaps increase
their returns to the society where they are living, an increase in liquid-
ity. That is another issue I wanted to get John Helliwell and Alan
Taylor’s opinion on.
Mr. Turner: I wanted to also pick up John Helliwell’s challenge to
think about this in welfare terms and to point out, as Andrew Crock-
ett has already said, that actually we are talking about things as a
problem, which in many ways are very good things. It is not just
aging, which is a very good thing. World population stabilization is a
very good thing for all sorts of reasons to do with the environment,
the preservation of wild spaces, etc. And world population stabiliza-
tion is also the inevitable consequence of other good things because,
as I said yesterday, if we achieve reasonable economic growth
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lation stabilization. 
If eventually the whole world achieves world population stabiliza-
tion, then immigration cannot be a solution for the whole world’s
pensions system challenge. But it is a potential transitional solution
for some countries. But it is an intermediate solution with a conse-
quence, which is that you will eventually have to deal with the
problems of population stability but at a higher population level and
higher population density.
And population density in itself has certain congestion externality
costs.
It is an observable fact that the acceptance of immigration as a solu-
tion is much greater in America than it is in Europe. What I would
like to suggest is that this is not simply an arbitrary conservatism on
the part of Europe, but it is the rational response of Europe to a
higher level of population density. If you fly over Denver and look
down on Denver, you have a completely different attitude about the
idea of population expansion, new housing development, and the
benefits that will give of a larger tax base to support your pay-as-you-
go system than if you fly over London, where you believe that further
housing development around London is going to destroy valued
countryside. Or that, if housing development does not occur, it is
going to make housing increasingly a positional good, so that the
benefits of those extra workers to support your pay-as-you-go system
are offset by the fact that we are all frantically competing for a small
supply of nice houses in pleasant locations. Europe has a population
density, if you take the whole of Europe including Scandinavia, about
three or four times that of the United States’ lower 48 states. So
Europe’s doubt on immigration may be rational welfare maximiza-
tion when we take a wider perspective than simply thinking about the
benefits to dependency ratios that come from immigration. That is
not to say that Europe should exclude immigration—it should have
some. But simply that if people are rational welfare maximizers,
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is not simply arbitrary conservatism.
Mr. Feldstein: Regarding the point about whether more immigrants
would help our pay-as-you-go system, there are two aspects that are
not helpful. 
First, the immigrant who comes at age 40 and works until age 65
and then retires, even if he or she earns the average earnings in the
U.S. population, which typically they do not, for Social Security
purposes they would be classified as a low-wage worker. Why?
Because the way we calculate the formula, we would add in all the
zeros for the years they did not contribute and average them in. Then
we would provide a replacement rate based on that average, which
would give them, given the structure of our benefits, a substantially
higher replacement rate than a middle-income worker in the United
States who had worked a full lifetime. 
The other thing is, of course, we have a system that is not struc-
turally sound and is losing money. If we add more people, we will lose
money on more people. So, unless we are prepared to reform the
system, that is not going to be a solution at all.
Mr. Sinai:This question is for John Helliwell. Regarding outsourc-
ing, there are a couple of pages in the paper about offshore
outsourcing. Do you have any idea of the magnitudes involved and
do you have an opinion on how big a phenomenon that might be?
And second, I see why anecdotally I am observing so many foreign-
born workers in the United States from your point number 6, which
talks about a foreign-born percentage of the entire U.S. population
rising from about 8 percent to 11 percent over the decade of the
1990s. That is really quite a big increase. What is the latest percent-
age for 2004 on foreign-born workers in the United States? Are there
other cities than the ones you mentioned where there are such a large
percentage of foreign-born workers relative to the national average?
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shows the developing countries are now at the point where the indus-
trialized countries were at in 1994 in terms of the amount of capital
controls they have. This seems quite astounding. Do you believe that?  
Ms. Woodall: John Helliwell and others have mentioned that China
is aging as rapidly as OECD countries and is not that far behind.
Therefore, it cannot be seen as part of the solution to OECD coun-
tries and indeed has problems of its own. I wonder if looking at the
crude dependency ratio in China is slightly misleading. In China, you
have a very high proportion of underemployed workers. About 60
percent of the population is still in rural areas. Many of those in effect
have a marginal product close to zero. Over the coming decades as
they join the more formal workforce, will that offset part of the aging
process, so in fact if you look at the effective population of working
age or the effective labor force that will not fall as a proportion of the
population by as much?
Mr. Taylor: In response to Stan Fischer’s question, I did not discuss
that figure. But if I had, I would have emphasized that it is more
useful for showing the differences between the 1970s and today,
rather than for making comparison across countries within periods;
rather than the commonalities in the trends, I would emphasize the
slower reduction I barriers in developing countries and I agree they
probably have a ways to go. It is a very crude index that goes from one
to three and it has been averaged, it is derived from the work of
Kaminsky and Schmukler. One can get more detailed data from
Dennis Quinn. It is a very narrow set of criteria, so I do not think it
applies to everything on both the current and capital account. Even
if developing countries have lowered their controls on average, part of
the risk premium and the obstacles or the barriers to capital move-
ment is the probabilistic nature of capital controls. Are they going to
be imposed in a crisis? Are they going to go on and off is still an issue,
and this is not captured by the crude index. So, yes, I think substan-
tial policy barriers remain.
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to the benefits of migration. She spoke about remittances back home.
Also it creates labor scarcity in the sending country. One of my
friends and colleagues, Kevin O’Rourke, has written on that for
Ireland in the 19th century—immigration as a form of famine relief.
In that sense, the neoclassical model is predicting some kind of equi-
table effects there. It should be bringing up the wage in the sending
country, perhaps lowering the return on capital. This ties into some
of John’s Helliwell’s discussion because there are some potential links
here between the neoclassical and Heckscher-Ohlin models’ predic-
tions. The latter model suggests that trade and integration are going
to have an impact distributionally, one which is likely more equitable
in the developing countries, tending to raise wages and lower the
return on capital (or raise unskilled wages and lower skilled wages). 
Contrast that with the outsourcing-and-happiness story that John
Helliwell told, which in some ways is a little bit like a cherry-picking
story ironically, given what he had said. So, if you take a social capital
or status gradient approach what is going on, then if the IT guy in
Silicon Valley is suddenly paid less because his job has been moved to
Bangalore, in California, that is happy news for the lower-paid Cali-
fornians. We obtain a more even gradient in our society. But what has
happened in India? We expect to see a rise in the wage of the skilled
worker there, not an unskilled worker. That kind of outsourcing is
rather like selective migration if it is only happening at the high-skill
level. I am a little bit concerned about whether that example will
exacerbate the kind of social capital or status gradient problems that
have been discussed by Michael Marmot, Robert Putnam, and others.
I am not completely sure which way that kind of outsourcing will go,
but it could conceivably worsen rather than improve social capital in
the poorer countries.
Mr. Helliwell: Picking up Alan Taylor’s last point, I would agree
that outsourcing has some features in common with migration. What
I was suggesting was that some of these trade possibilities may have
lower economic and social cost than the migration alternatives. It
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outsourcing case, since the export-oriented Indian IT workers remain
embedded in their local communities. That remains to be studied.
Regarding Allen Sinai’s point, how big is this outsourcing now? Not
very big, in part because if it is going to be successful it has to rely on
the sorts of slowly built reputational intermediation that I described
in my paper. I attended a recent IT outsourcing of people in the
industry, and discovered that they see themselves now, in the Indian
conglomerate Tata and other firms, as corporate-level reputational
intermediators. They also think they may be ready to move to a larger
scale, building bridges in a bigger way. For the reasons Alan Taylor
notes, governments in India will want to ensure that these activities
are facilitated in ways that allow communities to be strengthened
rather than fractured. Just as the payments back to the home coun-
tries of foreign workers can help the community from which they
came, so the high pay of the people who are working on these
outsourcing jobs in India can be put to the benefit of those commu-
nities. The more cohesive those communities are, the more likely it is
that redistribution takes place naturally rather than coercively. Alan
Sinai also asked for the latest numbers on the foreign-born popula-
tion. The data from the 2003 Current Population Survey (published
in August 2004) place the foreign-born share of the U.S. population
at 11.7 percent. The more detailed 2000 census shows that the
foreign-born share is much higher in urban areas, and especially in
the gateway cities for Hispanic immigration. There were six cities
(with populations exceeding 100,000) in 2000 with foreign-born
shares exceeding 50 percent. Of these four were in California and two
in Florida. The fact that immigration—and this returns to Adair
Turner’s point—is predominantly, almost overwhelmingly, urban
now means that the size of your Outback is irrelevant compared with
how life is being lived in the cities and countries where immigrants
are going. The real question is: What is happening to city life and city
densities? You have to get back to the quality and nature of life in
those places. 
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ett’s query about possible ways of getting a positive spin on later-life
engagement. I say, let us start broadening the way we think of this
engagement. The well-being results show us that it is the engagement
and a sense of efficacy that make people want to contribute and help
others. It is not the salary. Regular commercial-type employment
becomes a smaller and smaller share of what people want. It is the
flexibility and to deal with people they trust. Doing something valu-
able to help others is increasingly the kind of thing people are going
to want to do. Whether done through community organizations,
sports organizations, families, or more formal groups, such activities
help fill the gaps in the welfare system as well as the gaps in people’s
lives. If that kind of activity can be facilitated, it not only lowers the
cost of official dependency-supporting programs, but also strongly
increases the life satisfaction of the contributors. That will run hand
in hand, I forecast, with more extended and more flexible involve-
ment in the paid workforce, but the paid involvement will be the
lesser part of the total if the total is well-designed.
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